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HOW FIRMS RESPOND TO FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT:





Although past studies have paid considerable attention to firms’ reputations, few have
investigated the actions that firms take following a reputation-damaging event.We identify
firms involved in financial earnings restatements and examine whether naming a succes-
sor CEO with specific qualities serves to signal the seriousness of a firm’s efforts to restore
its reputation. Using theories of market signaling, we argue that attributes of successor
CEOs significantly influence the reactions of key external constituencies. In particular,
firms with more severe restatement tend to name successors who have prior CEO or
turnaround experience and a more elite education. The naming of such successors results
in more positive reactions from the stock market, financial analysts, and mass media. We
argue that these attributes sendmessages to stakeholders and the broader public about the
CEO’s credibility and the firm’s efforts.
A firm’s reputation is critical to its success
(Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011; Rindova, Williamson, Pet-
kova, & Sever, 2005) and helps it compete for re-
sources and differentiate itself from competitors
(Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Work on corporate reputa-
tion over the past two decades has demonstrated
that a good reputation provides a number of advan-
tages, including better access to capital (Stuart, Ho-
ang, & Hybels, 1999), increased status (Podolny &
Phillips, 1996), greater growth and survival (Rao,
1994), and superior financial performance (Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006). Most research has argued that
the reputation of a firm is a somewhat stable char-
acteristic for it (Fombrun, 1996; Rindova et al.,
2005), but recent scholarship has shown that a
firm’s reputation can change quickly when unfa-
vorable information is revealed or if the firm be-
comes associated with illegitimate or fraudulent
acts (Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Mishina, Block, &
Mannor, 2012; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor,
2008). While numerous scholars have focused on
the steps that firms can take to establish and main-
tain a favorable reputation (Lange et al., 2011; Fom-
brun & Shanley, 1990), past research has paid much
less attention to how firms might recover from a
loss in reputation (Rhee & Kim, 2012). To expand
our understanding of this phenomenon, our study
examines firms’ actions in response to reputation-
damaging events and how markets and the media
react to the firms’ actions.
We adopt the definition of reputation proposed
by Lee, Pollock, and Jin (2011) and Rindova et al.
(2005), which describes “firm reputation” as an
intangible asset based on broad public recogni-
tion of the quality of that firm’s activities and
outputs. Past work has argued that the most com-
mon source of firm-level reputation damage
comes from financial misconduct and misrepre-
sentation (Karpoff, 2012; Pfarrer et al., 2008), and
scandals at Enron and WorldCom are two of the
more egregious examples of public companies
engaging in fraudulent financial actions that de-
stroyed billions of dollars of market value and
damaged the firms’ reputations. The aftermath of
financial misconduct can have a direct impact on
broader capital markets—for instance, the effects
of the failure of Long-Term Capital Management
and Bernard Madoff’s Investment Securities LLC
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on broader market indices. Financial misconduct
represents a visible, specific organizational event
that has the clear potential to trigger a loss in firm
reputation as well as to impose serious material
repercussions for the organization (Desai, Hogan,
& Wilkins, 2006; Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Bel-
sito, 2009; Flanagan, Muse, & O’Shaughnessy,
2008; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008).
Firms that are caught misrepresenting their fi-
nancial position can be reasonably expected to
take some action in response to this revelation,
and studies have noted that the most common
action is to replace the leader of the organiza-
tion—i.e., the CEO (Farber, 2005; Arthaud-Day,
Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (Sarbanes & Oxley,
2002) specifically assigned greater responsibility
to the CEO for financial oversight, further high-
lighting the chief executive’s critical role in pre-
venting the occurrence of financial misconduct.
Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that firms will
be able to influence the judgment of external
constituencies by replacing their CEOs. Thus, it
is important to determine whether new leader-
ship affects external observers’ judgment of a
firm and the extent to which they react favorably
to such changes.
Our central research objectives are to examine
the types of successor leaders named following
the admission of financial restatement and to
determine whether particular successor charac-
teristics are more or less likely to be positively
perceived by key external observers. Financial
restatement reflects a form of firm misconduct
and misrepresentation that can result from both
intentional acts to deceive and from managerial
incompetence, both of which damage a firm’s
reputation by failing to provide stakeholders
with credible and accurate financial information.
Scholars have used signaling theory (Spence,
1973) to examine the role of executive character-
istics in signaling firm quality to the financial
markets, but most of this work has been done in
the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) (e.g.,
Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Higgins
& Gulati, 2003, 2006; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009).
In this study, we employ signaling theory to ex-
amine how financial restatement prompts firms
to replace incumbent CEOs with well-qualified
successors who possess attributes that are observ-
able to external observers and relatively hard to
attain—prior CEO experience, prior turnaround
experience, an elite education, and previous
functional experience in finance or account-
ing—in turn making them suitable signals
(Spence, 1973) to communicate the seriousness
of the firm’s effort to respond to a reputation-
damaging event.
Our study provides an appropriate setting for
highlighting the three key components of signal-
ing theory: the role of the signaler, the signal
itself, and the receiver, all three of which
have not been examined simultaneously in past
studies (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel,
2011). In our study the severity of the firm’s
restatement represents a characteristic of the sig-
naler, the choice of the successor (and their char-
acteristics) represents variance in the signal it-
self, and variance in reaction across recipients
represents the role of the receiver. We test these
ideas in a sample of 352 pairs of restating and
non-restating (matching) firms for a total of 704
firms involved in financial restatement.
We believe this study offers several contributions
to the literature. First, we complement past studies
that have tended to examine reputation restoration
in a normative manner (i.e., what firms should do)
rather than empirically (i.e., what actions they ac-
tually take) (Rhee & Kim, 2012). Drawing on sig-
naling theories, we show how firms respond to
reputation damage by appointing a successor
CEO with specific characteristics that help signal
the firm’s commitment and responsiveness to re-
storing the reputation of the firm. Interestingly,
our study also reveals non-obvious findings, such
as how a signal that may be among the least
informative regarding a CEO’s ability to address
the problem at hand (elite education) appears to
have the strongest overall effect across the broad-
est range of audiences. Second, our research il-
lustrates how the type of CEO successor named
varies depending on the severity of the restate-
ment, demonstrating that the reactions from the
broader market, financial analysts, and the media
vary depending on the severity of the restatement
and the qualities of the successor. This comple-
ments past studies that have examined the effects
of restatement more broadly but that have not
differentiated among degrees of severity (e.g.,
Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). Our results provide
insights into how severity influences the extent
to which firms may be motivated to take remedial
action and calibrate their responses.
Finally, our study further contributes to signaling
theory by simultaneously demonstrating the impor-
tance of signal characteristics, examining the effect
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of signals across different receivers, and focusing
on negative qualities of the signalers. Specifically,
our findings show that a similar signal, e.g., a CEO
successor with a finance or accounting background,
can generate different reactions across different re-
cipients of the signal. This provides an interesting
extension to past work that has assumed a signal
will be interpreted in the same way by various
audiences (Spence, 1973).
THEORY
Research in firm reputation has focused primar-
ily on building and managing reputations, with less
attention paid to the potential consequences of rep-
utation damage (Mishina et al., 2012; Pfarrer et al.,
2008; Rhee & Kim, 2012). While many organiza-
tions take a good reputation for granted, a bad rep-
utation can be difficult to correct (Zimmerman &
Zeitz, 2002), and past research has demonstrated
that a damaged reputation leads individuals and
other organizations to disassociate themselves from
a firm involved in illicit activities (Elsbach & Bhat-
tacharya, 2001; Devers et al., 2009). For example,
the defection of many of Arthur Andersen’s clients
following the failure of Enron was described in
large part as an effort by client firms to distance
themselves from Arthur Andersen’s reputational
damage (Jensen, 2006).
Reputation theorists have studied how negative
events may damage a firm’s reputation, but they
have not examined how reputations can be posi-
tively influenced following the damage (Mishina &
Devers, 2012). Although Rhee and colleagues (Rhee
& Valdez, 2009; Rhee & Kim, 2012) have discussed
the concept of reputation restoration, the success of
different approaches to signal attempts at reputa-
tion restoration has yet to be examined in a large-
scale empirical work. Past studies that have ad-
dressed reputation restoration efforts have instead
mostly focused on cases involving a single firm or a
small set of firms; examples include BP’s handling
and communications around the 2010 oil drilling
accident in the Gulf of Mexico and Apple’s re-
sponse to critical antenna problems that led to
dropped calls in the initial iPhone 4 release
(Elsbach, 2012).
Elsbach (1994) has demonstrated how, in the in-
terest of reestablishing a firm’s reputation and le-
gitimacy, acknowledging past mistakes is more ef-
fective than denying misconduct, although mere
acknowledgement may not be sufficient (Pozner,
2008). Beyond acknowledgement of wrongdoing,
firms may need to take more decisive action to
defend their legitimacy and maintain their reputa-
tions (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008).
Pfarrer et al. (2008) theorize that, in order to recover
their reputations, firms evolve through four spe-
cific stages: discovery, explanation, penance, and
rehabilitation. During the final rehabilitation
phase, external groups and stakeholders expect or-
ganizations that have engaged in reputation-dam-
aging activities to serve punishment commensurate
with the seriousness of their transgressions (Devers
et al., 2009). Firms in such situations can attempt to
pacify stakeholders by taking significant, demon-
strable actions to publicly signal a determination to
purge past illegitimate conduct and to focus on
renewal (Pfarrer et al., 2008). Signaling theory
(Spence, 1973; Noe, 2012) argues that such actions
are critically important in cases where the desired
outcome (in this case the firm’s determination to
restore its reputation) is hard to observe directly. In
such cases, the actions that signal seriousness are
those likely to help the firm restore its reputation
(Pfarrer et al., 2008).
Financial Restatements and Reputation Damage
Our study examines reputation damage as the
result of financial earnings restatements. We focus
on firm financial restatement due to accounting
irregularities identified by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO). These irregularities
are caused by either the misreporting or the misuse
of facts, and result in the firm publicly restating its
earnings. Research shows that restatement can be
severely damaging to a firm’s reputation for several
reasons. Most simply, underlying ill intent poten-
tially involved with such restatement clearly vio-
lates normative expectations of ethical behavior
(Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). Similarly, as such an
illegitimate action violates institutional norms and
societal values, financial restatement may cause
stakeholders and observers to perceive the firm as
flawed and discredited (Harris & Bromiley, 2007).
Finally, financial restatement damages a firm’s rep-
utation because stakeholders perceive that top
management has substantial control over the repre-
sentation of the firm’s financial position (Devers et
al., 2009). This perception of controllability creates
a belief that financial restatement may be the result
of a conscious decision by the firm’s top manage-
ment to mislead shareholders and other external
observers.
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The publicity and importance of a restatement
and its potential deleterious effect on firm reputa-
tion has been highlighted in past findings that firm
restatements generate a substantial level of media
coverage and scrutiny (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales,
2007; Gertsen, 2009). A number of studies in the
accounting literature have also demonstrated a sig-
nificant, negative market response to the announce-
ment of financial restatements (Owers, Lin, & Rog-
ers, 2002; Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 2004;
Karpoff et al., 2008). When restatements are an-
nounced, outsiders seeking to understand what
happened and assign responsibility often transfer
attributions of responsibility (and blame) from the
organization to individuals associated with the or-
ganization (Rider, Negro, & Roberts, 2011). In re-
sponse to these attributions, one of the first actions
often taken by firms seeking to recover damaged
reputations is to disassociate the organization from
those seen to be responsible (Devers et al., 2009). A
substantial body of research has demonstrated that
the CEO is often held responsible for the actions of
the organization (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Canella,
2009). As Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich (1985)
note, observers tend to give CEOs a disproportion-
ate amount of credit and blame for successes and
failures, a phenomenon they refer to as “the ro-
mance of leadership.”
Removing leaders seen as responsible for finan-
cial restatement serves as a straightforward signal
of the firm’s intent to deal seriously with the prob-
lem (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Karpoff, 1999; Devers et al.,
2009; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). As Noe (2012) notes,
redeeming or recovering a firm’s reputation by
“cleaning house” is a direct way to help distance
the firm from past managerial culpability in illicit
activity. Past empirical work also supports this ar-
gument: Desai et al. (2006) found that 59% of the
firms that restated their earnings replaced the CEO
or president within two years, and Arthaud-Day et
al. (2006) found that CEOs, CFOs, outside directors,
and audit committee members were all more likely
to leave firms with financial restatements than
firms that were not required to restate their earn-
ings. As Gertsen observes, “managers are often dis-
credited following a restatement—be it in a court of
law, the court of public opinion, or as they sud-
denly find themselves in search of a job” (2009:
103). Through dissociation from former top manag-
ers perceived as responsible for the organization’s
failing, a firm can signal to the public that it is
serious about recovering from financial restate-
ment, and can start to reestablish its reputation and
legitimacy.
Successor CEO Characteristics
Although past work has examined the correlation
between financial restatements and CEO replace-
ment, it has not examined the effect of the severity
of the restatement on the type of CEO successor
who is chosen or the signal that such a successor
sends to external observers about the seriousness of
the firm’s response to the restatement. Given that
the CEO is both a substantive and symbolic repre-
sentative of the organization (Pfeffer, 1983), the
appointment of a successor CEO signals the inten-
tion of the firm to restore its reputation (Zhang &
Wiersema, 2009). As Rhee and Kim (2012) note,
events that more significantly damage the firm’s
reputation are likely to lead to more significant
restoration efforts, and our study specifically exam-
ines how the severity of the reputation damage is
associated with the extent to which the firm takes
efforts to restore its reputation. A firm faced with a
severe restatement may feel more urgency to hire a
successor CEO who is seen as competent and qual-
ified to signal the firm’s seriousness about restoring
its reputation. The naming of such a successor is
likely to produce a positive reaction to the succes-
sion announcement, in turn suggesting that the suc-
cession has been effective in helping to restore the
reputation of the firm. We examine the signaling
impact of four key characteristics of CEO succes-
sors on the reactions of outside observers: the suc-
cessors’ prior experience as CEOs, their prior expe-
rience as turnaround managers, their educational
backgrounds and prestige, and their functional
experience.
Chief executive experience.A key characteristic
that may influence external parties’ assessment of
successor CEOs is past CEO experience. Given that
the CEO position differs significantly from all oth-
ers within a firm (Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter,
2013; Kesner & Sebora, 1994), previous CEO expe-
rience may be seen as the most concrete evidence
that a designated successor has the requisite back-
ground to help the firm restore its damaged repu-
tation. As Finkelstein et al. (2009) note, prior expe-
rience as a chief executive is the most relevant
background for an individual being chosen for that
position. Experienced CEOs bring familiarity and
credibility to the position and can point to task-
specific expertise and knowledge that they can le-
verage to help reestablish the reputation and prom-
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inence of the firm. According to Miller and
Shamsie (2001), CEO experience may serve as a
proxy for CEO candidates’ task ability and influ-
ence and be seen as predictive of the quality of their
decision-making and the resulting outcomes for the
organization. For example, when James Kilts was
hired as the chief executive of Gillette in 2001,
Gillette was suffering from reputational problems
that stemmed from poor performance and declining
share price (Graffin et al., 2013). Because Kilts
came into Gillette as a highly-regarded executive
who had established a positive reputation as CEO
of Nabisco, observers (the stock market, financial
analysts, and media) reacted quite favorably to his
appointment. Subsequent coverage of Gillette’s
turnaround attributed the improved performance to
Kilts, further reinforcing his reputation as an expe-
rienced and successful CEO.
By hiring a successor with experience as a chief
executive, a firm signals to outside constituencies
that it is serious about responding to a reputation-
damaging event through experienced, well-qualified
new leadership. The hiring of a successor with prior
chief executive experience may be especially critical
when the restatement has been severe and the need to
demonstrate responsiveness especially acute.
Hypothesis 1a. The more severe the financial
restatement, the greater the likelihood that the
successor CEO will have prior CEO experience.
Turnaround experience. Firms responding to
reputational damage, particularly when it is more
severe, may signal CEO credibility by appointing
successors with prior turnaround experience (Chen
& Hambrick, 2012). Successor CEOs’ experience in
turnaround situations can increase outside observ-
ers’ confidence in their ability to manage the after-
math of a financial restatement and restore the past
prominence of a firm. When restatements are more
severe, outsiders may find prior experience in turn-
around situations to be particularly salient or ap-
propriate as a means of assessing the competence of
the successor and the quality of the firm’s response
to a financial restatement.
Hypothesis 1b. The more severe the financial
restatement, the greater the likelihood that the
successor CEO will have prior turnaround
experience.
Elite educational background. In relation to
their “upper echelons” framework, Hambrick and
Mason (1984) have argued that education is an
important indicator of the skills and abilities of top
managers, especially CEOs. Past empirical work
has typically equated education quality with attri-
butes such as cognitive ability and capacity for
information processing (Datta & Guthrie, 1994), and
past research has also shown that a degree from an
elite institution can be an indication of ability (Wi-
ersema & Bantel, 1992). Even though education
may only be loosely linked to an individual’s com-
petence, it is a straightforward and accessible char-
acteristic that can easily be interpreted to signal
differences in ability. In his original work on mar-
ket signaling, Spence (1973) used the example of
educational prestige as a labor market signal denot-
ing the quality of the individual. The status and
prestige associated with prior education helps out-
side observers in assessing CEO successors, in-
creasing the likelihood that restating firms will se-
lect successors with more prestigious educational
backgrounds (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Jensen, Kim, &
Kim, 2012). Since employers cannot fully under-
stand the overall quality of job candidates, given
information asymmetry, an elite educational back-
ground provides a proxy signal of quality. Higher-
status, more exclusive, educational institutions are
viewed as more likely to select students based on
attributes such as intelligence and success, charac-
teristics that are likely to also be important to out-
siders evaluating the quality of the successor
(Podolny, 2001, 2005).
In cases where a firm’s reputation has been dam-
aged by a financial restatement, the educational
background of the CEO successors may play an
important role in signaling the quality and manage-
rial ability of the successor. Firms facing a more se-
vere restatement are likely to hire a replacement chief
executivewith an elite educational background, since
holding a more elite degree may send a stronger and
more positive signal to stakeholders of the firm’s re-
sponsiveness to the financial restatement.
Hypothesis 2. The more severe the financial
restatement, the more elite the educational
background of the replacement CEO.
Functional experience. The reputational prob-
lems that result from financial restatement are
likely to require a successor whose credentials and
expertise suit the challenge confronting the organ-
ization, and outsiders may see a firm as most re-
sponsive to problems resulting in a financial re-
statement if it hires a new CEO with this
background and expertise. Given that firms restat-
ing earnings need to improve the reporting of their
financial positions, CEO successors who have ex-
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pertise in financial reporting may present a valu-
able fit for the needs of the firm and the expecta-
tions of outside stakeholders (Chen & Hambrick,
2012). This may be especially important when the
restatement is more severe.
Although top managers, especially CEOs, are pre-
sumed to have a generalist’s perspective, their ca-
reers have usually advanced through a primary
functional area. This means that they bring to the
CEO position specialized knowledge, aptitudes,
and skills (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Since firms that
experience the reputation-damaging event of a fi-
nancial restatement may want to emphasize a re-
newed focus on unbiased and accurate financial
reporting, they may be more likely to select succes-
sors with qualifications and prior experience in the
areas of accounting and finance. As Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) note, the choice of a successor may
be influenced by functional experience in situa-
tions where a particular kind of expertise is con-
sidered critically important for resolving important
challenges. In the case of a restatement, a CEO
successor whose primary experience has been in
finance and accounting may signal to outside con-
stituencies that the firm is emphasizing the impor-
tance of accurate financial reporting and that every
effort is being made to ensure that these types of
problems will be avoided in the future. By hiring a
successor with past experience in finance or ac-
counting, the firm may reassure stakeholders that
financial restatement will not occur again.
Hypothesis 3. The more severe the financial
restatement, the greater the likelihood that the
successor CEO will have functional experience
in the areas of finance or accounting.
External Reactions
If successors’ characteristics function as signals
of ability and competence, then the characteristics
of a CEO successor named after a financial restate-
ment should influence external reactions to the
successor announcement. Since successful reputa-
tion restoration ultimately depends on outside
perceptions, a firm’s success in signaling its deter-
mination to restore its reputation can be most ef-
fectively assessed by observing informed outsiders’
reactions to the successor announcement (Rhee &
Kim, 2012; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Successor CEOs
who are perceived to be more qualified are likely to
generate a more positive reception by outside ob-
servers, with this positive reaction likely to be con-
ditional on the severity of the restatement. A more
positive reaction to a firm’s succession announce-
ment indicates that the firm’s response to financial
restatement has been viewed as more successful.
We focus on the reactions of three constituencies
who closely follow firms and can judge the likely
impact of succession events: (1) reactions of the
market, (2) reactions of analysts, and (3) reactions
of the media.
Market reactions. Stock market reactions to the
naming of a successor CEO represent an objective
indication of the extent to which shareholders en-
dorse or repudiate the successor’s appointment
(Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). As such, they offer a
direct judgment by owners and potential owners of
the quality of the appointment (Graffin et al., 2013).
Thus, we would expect a firm’s efforts that are
perceived as more successful to result in a more
positive market reaction.
Analysts’ reactions. Investment analysts are usu-
ally employed by investment banks or brokerage
firms, and their job is to assess the future prospects
of a company by gathering information from pub-
lished reports and quarterly earnings conference
calls (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). Analysts are
viewed as knowledgable information intermediar-
ies in financial markets (Cowen & Marcel, 2011),
and their reports can play an important role in
investors’ decisions and on the future share price of
a firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As Wiesenfeld et
al. (2008: 234) note, investment analysts are legiti-
mate arbiters qualified to assess a firm and its lead-
ership, “possess[ing] prominent and legitimate
platforms for rendering assessments of firms and
the individuals associated with them.” For these
reasons, favorable investment analyst reactions to a
succession announcement should provide an im-
portant measure of the perceived success of the
firm’s intention to restore its reputation.
Media reactions.Mass media plays an important
role as an intermediary between firms and stake-
holders by providing information about firm ac-
tions (Desai, 2011; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Zavy-
alova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). For example
Rao (1994) discusses how media coverage helped
competing firms obtain legitimacy and build a rep-
utation in the early years of the U.S. auto industry.
In the case of financial restatements, the media influ-
ences whether firms are perceived to be pursuing a
proper course of reputation rebuilding by reporting
on the firm’s actions and by providing an indepen-
dent outside perspective (Bednar, 2012). In reacting
to a restating firm’s successor selection, the media
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play a role similar to that of shareholders and ana-
lysts: favorable media coverage at the succession an-
nouncement communicates a positive assessment of
the firm’s efforts to restore its reputation.
In summary, following a financial restatement
we expect shareholder reactions, investment ana-
lyst reactions, and media reactions to be more fa-
vorable when appointed CEO successors exhibit
characteristics that signal their ability to restore the
reputation of the firm.
Hypothesis 4a. Following a financial restate-
ment, the more severe the restatement the more
favorable the reactions of the market, analysts,
and the media to a CEO successor with prior
CEO experience.
Hypothesis 4b. Following a financial restate-
ment, the more severe the restatement the more
favorable the reactions of the market, analysts,
and the media to a CEO successor with prior
turnaround experience.
Hypothesis 4c. Following a financial restate-
ment, the more severe the restatement the more
favorable the reactions of the market, analysts,
and the media to a CEO successor with an elite
educational background.
Hypothesis 4d. Following a financial restate-
ment, the more severe the restatement the more
favorable the reactions of the market, analysts,
and the media to a CEO successor with prior
experience in accounting or finance.
METHODS
Data
Following past literature that examines financial
restatement, we focused on restatements that in-
volved the disclosure of earnings revisions
(Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007;
Hennes, Leone, & Miller, 2008). These restatements
are reported by the U.S. Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO, 2002, 2006), which includes re-
statements issued as a result of aggressive account-
ing practices, intentional and unintentional misuse
of facts, misinterpretation or oversight of account-
ing rules, and misrepresentation; but not normal
corporate activity, simple presentation issues, or
accounting policy changes. Following past studies
that single out downward revisions in earnings as a
primary cause of damage to a firm’s reputation
(Collins, Masli, Reitanga, & Sanchez, 2009; Kinney
& McDaniel, 1989; Palmrose et al., 2004), we fo-
cused specifically on restatements that affected rev-
enue recognition or expenses, and that resulted in a
downward revision of earnings. We excluded non-
U.S.-based firms to avoid any differences in cul-
tural or financial reporting requirements (Pfarrer et
al., 2008). The time frame during which we exam-
ined restatements is 2003–2006, which begins two
years after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom
and so minimizes top management team (TMT)
personnel turnover resulting from the spillover ef-
fects of those cases (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006).1
Firms with missing data (e.g., lack of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings) were ex-
cluded, leaving us with a final sample of 352 re-
stating firms.
A matched-pair sampling design is particularly
suitable for examining phenomena with a low base
rate of occurrence, as in the case of restatements
(Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Harris & Bromiley, 2007).
Similar to other studies of restatement events (e.g.,
Agrawal et al., 1999; Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Kin-
ney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; Richardson, Tuna, &
Wu, 2003), we matched each restating firm with a
firm that did not issue a restatement. We identified
matching firms in a stratified manner by first identi-
fying potential matching firms from the same four-
digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code as
the restating firms and selecting matching firms from
the same restatement year. To ensure equivalency in
firm size, we selected matching firms with total asset
size closest to that of the paired restating firm. To
check the equivalency of thematched pairs, we tested
the similarity of the two groups in terms of assets,
revenue, stockholders’ equity, net income, and return
on assets, finding no statistically significant differ-
ence between the groups on any of these dimensions
and providing confirmation that our procedure
yielded appropriate matches. This matching process
provided us with another 352 matching firms, yield-
ing a total of 704 restating and matching firms. Ap-
pendix A provides a detailed explanation of how we
arrived at the final sample.
Measures
Dependent variables: Successor CEO charac-
teristics. As outlined in our hypotheses, we tested
four CEO characteristics. In hypothesis 1a, the de-
1 The GAO ended the data collection in June 2006;
accordingly, our data are available only until then.
2014 1765Gomulya and Boeker
pendent variable is Successor CEO experience,
which takes the value of 1 if the successor CEO has
been a chief executive prior to joining the restating
firm, and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in Hypothesis 1b is
Successor turnaround CEO experience, which
takes the value of 1 if the successor CEO had an
experience as a CEO of returning a company
which had experienced a severe loss back to prof-
itability, and 0 otherwise. To calculate this, we
collected information on turnaround experience
following the procedure used by Chen and Ham-
brick (2012) and defined an organization experi-
encing a severe loss as one that had operating
returns on equity (ROE) greater than cost of eq-
uity (COE) for at least two consecutive years,
immediately followed by at least a year of oper-
ating loss. This measure captures companies that
abruptly swing from satisfactory performance to
very poor performance and ensures that we sam-
ple genuinely troubled firms rather than simply
stagnant or slowly deteriorating firms (Chen &
Hambrick, 2012). Following these criteria, we
identified all firms in the Compustat database
from 1990 to 2006 that suffered a severe loss.
Having established a set of firms that have suf-
fered a severe loss, we then identified those that
turned their performance around and returned to
profitability, which we labeled “turnaround”
firms. To isolate successors with turnaround CEO
experience for Hypothesis 1b, we identified in
our database CEOs who had been put in charge as
the CEO of a “severe loss” firm (as defined above)
during the time it had experienced severe losses,
and who had then returned the firm to profitabil-
ity during the CEO’s tenure. These criteria en-
sured that we both identified a successor CEO
who had previously been put in charge of a firm
when it was in trouble, and also that the succes-
sor CEO was in charge during the organization’s
return to profitability.2
For Hypothesis 2, the dependent variable is
whether or not the successor CEO came from an
elite educational institution at the undergraduate
or graduate level. This binary variable, Successor
CEO elite education, takes the value of 1 if the
successor has an elite educational degree and 0
otherwise. Following past work in identifying elite
schools, we categorized graduates from the follow-
ing institutions as having an elite degree: Ivy-
League schools, public Ivy-League schools (e.g Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley: see Moll (1985) and
Long, Bowers, Barnett, & White (1998)), other elite
private schools (e.g., Stanford, MIT), and elite ser-
vice academies (e.g., the U.S. Naval Academy, Fin-
kelstein, 1992). Appendix B provides a list of all
the prominent schools used in creating our
measure.
In order to collect data on the successor’s educa-
tional background and prior experience as CEO, we
relied on several data sources. Following Graffin et
al. (2013) we used Zoominfo, LinkedIn, and Spoke.
com to identify the educational backgrounds of
business professionals and corporate leaders. Be-
yond these focused web searches, we checked sev-
eral websites that list CEOs’ information, including
Forbes, Business Week, Fortune and others. For
thoroughness, we also did a Google search by en-
tering the name of the company along with the
name of the CEO. We then checked the first five
pages of Google results for information on CEO
education and background. We undertook all of
these efforts in addition to reviewing the executive
biography in the proxy statement using SEC
EDGAR. Altogether, we have a high degree of con-
fidence in the reliability and comprehensiveness of
the data.
For Hypothesis 3, we used a binary variable,
Successor CEO from Fin/Acct, which takes the
value of 1 if the successor CEO’s functional back-
ground is in finance or accounting, and 0 other-
wise. Typical examples of financial or accounting
backgrounds include Controller, Vice President
for Finance, Chief Financial Controller, or Chief
Accounting Officer. This information is available
in the proxy statement, but we triangulate the
proxy statement with the data sources men-
tioned above.
Dependent variables: External reactions. Hy-
pothesis 4 examines whether the characteristics of
successor CEOs interact with the severity of the
restatement to result in more favorable reactions by
the stock market, investment analysts, and the
mass media.
Market reactions.We measured market reaction
as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surround-
ing the announcement of the successor CEO, from
two days prior to two days after the announcement
date of the successor CEO (Oler, Harrison, & Allen,
2008), and using financial event study analysis
2 20 CEOs were identified as “turnaround” CEOs (17
for restating firms and 3 for matching firms).
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(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).3 We perused a firm’s
official SEC filings, usually mentioned in Form 8-K
(current report), and any relevant news articles, to
ensure that we were using the precise date in our
analysis. The five-day window was employed be-
cause it allows researchers to capture any prior
leakage, which can easily happen for successor an-
nouncements, as well as any reaction that is not
immediately reflected on the day of restatement
and the following day (e.g., Yermack, 1997).
Analysts’ reactions. To gauge the reactions of
investment analysts to the succession, we mea-
sured the change in annual mean forecast made by
analysts following the focal firm. This measure was
operationalized as the difference between the first
earnings forecast made after the successor CEO was
announced and the last forecast made prior to the
announcement of the successor CEO (Palmrose et
al., 2004) and the earnings forecast data was ob-
tained from I/B/E/S. Using the successor CEO an-
nouncement date (and not the date the new CEO
assumed office) we identified differences in earn-
ings-per-share (EPS) forecast made by an analyst
immediately prior to the successor announcement
date, as compared with the forecast made immedi-
ately after the succession was announced. In each
case, the forecasts were made for the same target
forecast date (e.g., end of 2006). We dropped any
observations in which the duration between these
two consecutive forecasts is too great, settling on a
duration span of up to two months (63 days) be-
tween the pre-succession forecast and the post-suc-
cession forecast. Given that most analysts following
a firm tend to issue forecasts on a monthly basis,
there were only five forecasts that needed to be
dropped. The remaining forecasts have between-
forecast durations ranging from 27 to 35 days,
except for three instances that have between-fore-
cast durations of 55, 61, and 63 days. Overall, the
between-forecast duration has a mean of 31 days
and a standard deviation of 6 days. Subsequent
robustness checks demonstrated that this dura-
tion does not significantly influence analysts’
reaction.
Media reactions. We measured both positive
and negative media coverage. Past work has shown
that positive and negative coverage represents dis-
tinct properties rather than two poles of a contin-
uum (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs,
2001). To measure coverage around the announce-
ment of a successor CEO, we used the Lexis-Nexis
academic database to collect both national and re-
gional news articles from two days prior to the
announcement to two days after the announce-
ment. To identify relevant articles, we specified
that the name of the firm must be included in the
headline or title. Using these criteria, we down-
loaded a total of 2,305 articles. Following past stud-
ies (Bednar, 2012), we then focused on news arti-
cles that report on managerial issues. We removed
irrelevant articles and articles that provided no nar-
rative about the focal firm (typically these articles
mentioned several other firms and only listed
firms’ stock prices). Because we are examining me-
dia coverage around CEO succession, we also en-
sured that the article contained news about the
succession announcement.
The result was a total of 1,132 relevant articles
for our firms, which we then processed using com-
puter-aided text analysis software, namely the
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) pro-
gram, to measure the favorability of media content
(Bednar, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
LIWC text analysis software uses predefined dic-
tionaries of words to determine the rate at which
authors use words connoting positive or negative
tenor in a given text (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis,
2007).4 The program then calculates the score or
percentage of positive and negative content in each
article. Since positive and negative tenors in cov-
erage are distinct, we treated each positive and
negative tenor in each article as a separate con-
struct. The variable positive coverage was then
equal to the mean LIWC score for the positive tenor
category from all articles about a sample firm,
3 As part of their study, Oler et al. (2008) completed a
literature review of all event studies published in Stra-
tegic Management Journal, Academy of Management
Journal, Journal of Management, Management Science,
Administrative Science Quarterly, and Journal of Man-
agement Studies from 1994 to 2006. While there is vari-
ation across these studies, their Appendix lists a number
of studies in these leading journals that have used the
five-day windows (2 to 2 days from the event) as we
use here.
4 The LIWC dictionary uses 408 words to denote pos-
itive tenor and 499 words to denote negative tenor. A few
random examples of the positive words are: accepta*,
active*, admir*, giving, glad, gladly, good, gratef*, sat-
isf*, secur*. A few random examples of negative words
are: argu*, arrogan*, asham*, assault*, bad, bashful*,
harm, protest, uneas*. More information about the LIWC
software can be found on its website: www.liwc.net.
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while negative coverage was measured in the same
way but for negative tenor.
Independent variables. For Hypotheses 1–3, we
operationalized the severity of the restatement as
the total decrease in net income of the focal firm
following restatement divided by the firm revenue
for the year prior to the restatement announcement.
For Hypothesis 4, we interacted the severity of
restatement with the dependent variables used in
Hypotheses 1–3 (i.e., prior CEO experience, turn-
around experience, elite education, and functional
background) to test their effects on stock market
reactions, the change in the annual mean forecast
made by analysts, and positive and negative media
coverage. Since the matching firms have no restate-
ment, they were assigned a value of zero for their
severity measure, allowing us to fully capture the
range of our severity measure.
Control variables. We included a number of
control variables in our models. Firm age was mea-
sured in the restatement year, and firm size was
measured using firm revenue for the year prior to
the restatement announcement. We controlled for
temporal variation by including year dummies
(2003–2006). We controlled for firm performance
as the most recent return on assets (ROA) for the
firm prior to the incumbent CEO replacement,
based on the restated earnings.
For certain hypotheses we used specific con-
trol variables. For Hypotheses 2 and 3, which
examined the effect of restatement severity on the
successor CEO’s elite degree or experience in
finance or accounting, we controlled for whether
the incumbent CEO had an elite degree or a back-
ground in accounting or finance. In tests of Hy-
pothesis 4, which examined the dependent vari-
able of change in analysts’ forecasts, we
controlled for the change in the number of fore-
casts made by investment analysts, which may
influence the change in the earnings forecast
(Palmrose et al., 2004). Since stock market reac-
tion might also influence the change in analysts’
forecasts, we included our cumulative abnormal
return measure as a control variable.
Models and Estimation
To control for potential sample-selection bias
that may arise by focusing only on successor CEOs,
we estimated all our hypotheses using Heckman
regression models (Heckman, 1979). The estima-
tion process was separated into two stages, where
the outcome variable in the first stage is whether
or not the incumbent CEO will be replaced, and
the outcome variable in the second stage is either
the characteristic of the successor CEO or the
external reaction, depending on the hypothesis.
In cases where the final outcome variable in the
second stage is continuous (e.g., CAR), we used
the standard Heckman model. In cases where the
final outcome variable in the second stage is bi-
nary (e.g., whether or not the new CEO holds an
elite degree), we used the Heckman Probit model.
We employed the Heckman model to address
the potential issue of omitted variable bias that
might arise due to the selection process. In our
case, a biased selection process may arise be-
cause firms might self-select to replace their
CEOs or certain individuals might self-select to
step up and become a CEO of a restating firm.
Since such firms or individuals might have cer-
tain characteristics that can influence their deci-
sions that may be correlated with our variables of
interest but not be included in our model, the
Heckman model provides a technique to “esti-
mate the variables which when omitted from a
regression analysis give rise to the specification
error and use the estimated values of the omitted
variables as regressors so that it is possible to
estimate the behavioral functions of interest”
(Heckman, 1979: 153).
Using this method, the dependent variable in
the first stage is CEO replacement, which was
operationalized as a binary variable assigned a
value of 1 when the incumbent CEO is replaced
within two years after the restatement and 0 oth-
erwise. Following past literature (Arthaud-Day et
al., 2006), the two-year window was chosen be-
cause the replacement of a CEO may take more
than one year to be successfully implemented,
whereas examining a CEO replacement more than
two years after the restatement event may intro-
duce confounding factors unrelated to the
restatement.
To focus on cases where the CEO was replaced
and did not just retire or move to the board of
directors, we examined reasons behind a CEO step-
ping down. We investigated SEC filings and media
to see whether the CEO departure was due to re-
tirement, movement to another position in the firm
(e.g., as Chairman), movement to a similar position
at another firm, or clear health issues. Following
the convention of past CEO replacement studies
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Shen & Cannella, 2002),
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we excluded such cases since they do not reflect
purposeful replacement.5
For the matching firms, we applied a similar
method of identifying CEO replacement. However, as
the matching firms had no restatement or restatement
date, we measured CEO replacement by first assign-
ing the restatement date of a restating firm as the focal
date of its paired matching firm. For example, if a
restating firm announced its restatement in February
15, 2003, then this date became the focal date of the
paired matching firm. Consistent with our earlier
method, we then assigned a value of 1 when the CEO
of this matching firm was replaced within two years
after this focal date and 0 otherwise.
For the first-stage estimation, we controlled for
the board structure, since it can limit the likelihood
of CEO replacement (Boeker, 1992). Specifically,
we introduced the proportion of inside board mem-
bers and the proportion of board members ap-
pointed by the CEO. Using the same approach as
indicated above, we also controlled for firm age,
firm size, year dummies, ROA, whether or not the
focal firm would be merged or acquired within
two years after the restatement (merger), severity of
restatement, and the instrumental variables below.
Instrumental variables. To correct for potential
sample-selection bias, we included two instrumen-
tal variables in the selection equation (first stage)
that were correlated with the outcome in the first
stage but not with the outcome in the second stage
(Heckman, 1979). These instruments are incum-
bent CEO equity and incumbent CEO–Chairman
duality (1 when the CEO is the Chairman of the
board of directors and 0 otherwise). While CEOs’
equity or position as Chairman can influence their
probability of being replaced as CEOs (the outcome
in the first stage), these factors play no role in
influencing characteristics of the replacement CEO
(the outcome in the second stage). In cases where
replacement occurs (the sample for the second
stage), the incumbent CEOs were removed, and
therefore their power should not influence charac-
teristics of the successor CEO. We used robust stan-
dard error to minimize heteroscedasticity. We log-
transformed variables to reduce skewness and
kurtosis, as indicated in Table 2. All analyses are
done using Stata 11 (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009).
RESULTS
In Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics for all
the variables of interest. To test for multicolinearity,
the variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for
all of our models. In all cases the individual VIF for
each covariate as well as the average VIF for the
overall model indicated that multicollinearity
was not present (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990;
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2002). Tests using condition
index (Belsley, 1991) also indicate that none of the
condition numbers is greater than 30, which is the
suggested threshold for multicollinearity.6 For ease of
exposition, all means and standard deviations are
5 As part of a robustness check, we also examined our
hypotheses across both this sample and a full sample that
included all CEO departures. The results are robust for both
samples.
6 For CEO characteristics as the dependent variable, the
largest VIF (condition index) value is 2.13 (4.85). For other
dependent variables, the largest VIF value is 5.46 (8.90) for
CAR, 4.17 (10.11) for analysts’ forecast model, and 3.76 (6.48)
formedia coverage. Also, Stata automatically drops covariates
whenmulticollinearity is a serious concern (Kohler &Kreuter,
2009), yet none of our covariates was dropped.
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statisticsa,b
No Covariates Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 CEO replacement 0.26 0.44
2 Change in annual mean forecast 0.05 0.34 0.07
3 Cumulative Abnormal Return 1.35 9.55 0.07 0.02
4 Positive media coverage 1.93 0.78 0.12 0.00 0.03
5 Negative media coverage 0.55 0.49 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.27
6 Firm age 38.46 31.06 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.00
7 Firm size (USD mil.) 2649.37 8993.42 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.21
8 Year 2004 0.25 0.43 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.04
9 Year 2005 0.38 0.49 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.21 0.46
10 Year 2006 0.12 0.32 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.29
11 ROA 0.05 0.64 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.04 0.10 0.04
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shown in their original metrics, prior to any
transformations.
All significance tests reported are two-tailed. Re-
sults from the first stage suggest that ROA, incum-
bent CEO equity, and incumbent CEO–Chairman
duality significantly decrease the likelihood of CEO
replacement, while merger and acquisition and se-
verity of restatement increase the likelihood of re-
placement. The year dummies for 2004 and 2006
are also significant and negative. The effect of se-
verity of restatement on CEO replacement is also
reflected in descriptive statistics: 110 restating
firms replaced their CEOs within two years while
only 56 of the matching firms did so.
We report our results in Tables 2 to 4. Table 2
shows the effect of restatement severity on charac-
teristics of the successor CEO for Hypotheses 1 to 3.
Hypothesis 1a posited that more severe restate-
ments would increase the likelihood that the suc-
cessor CEO will have had prior experience as a
chief executive. Results in Model 1b of Table 2
demonstrate support for this hypothesis (  0.14,
p  0.05). Hypothesis 1b proposed that the more
severe the restatement, the more likely the succes-
sor CEO will have had prior turnaround experience
as a CEO. Results in Model 2b show that this hy-
pothesis was also supported (  0.17, p  0.05).
Hypothesis 2 argued that when a restatement is more
severe, the restating firm may be more likely to name
a CEO successor with a more elite educational back-
ground, and results in model 3b indicate support for
this hypothesis (  0.10, p  0.05). Hypothesis 3
proposed that the more severe the restatement, the
more likely the firmwould be to pick a successorwho
has functional experience in the areas of finance or
accounting. Interestingly, Model 4b of Table 2 indi-
cates that this hypothesized effect is reversed ( 
0.23, p  0.001). We discuss this opposite finding
in the discussion section.
Our final Hypothesis 4 examined how external
constituencies—the market, analysts, and the me-
dia—react to CEO successor announcements by re-
stating firms. We argued that successors who were
judged to be more qualified would elicit a more
favorable reaction in cases where the firm restate-
ment was more severe. We report the results sepa-
rately for each set of external constituencies and for
each characteristic of the successor CEO in Tables 3
and 4. Given the number of possible relationships
(four independent variables and four measures of
external reaction, yielding 16 potential relation-
ships) we highlight below the 13 relationships that
were significant in the Tables.
For Successor CEO experience, results in Tables 3
and 4 indicate that under conditions of greater re-
statement severity, the naming of a successor with
prior experience as a CEO results in better market
performance (Model 5c:   0.15, p  0.001),
TABLE 1
(continued)
No Covariates Mean SD 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
12 Severity of restatement 6.57% 71.78%
13 Change in number of forecast 0.36 2.14 0.13
14 Duration from last forecast 30.48 4.98 0.21 0.71
15 Successor CEO experience 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.15 0.09
16 Successor CEO turnaround
experience
0.17 0.38 0.18 0.04 0.30 0.14
17 Incumbent CEO elite education 0.25 0.44 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.08
18 Successor CEO elite education 0.29 0.45 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.10
19 Incumbent CEO Fin/Acct 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.09
20 Successor CEO Fin/Acct 0.13 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.10
21 Incumbent CEO equity 7.39% 13.95% 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.05
22 Incumbent CEO-Chairman
duality
0.64 0.48 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.28
23 Proportion of inside board 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.16 0.03
24 Proportion of board appt. by CEO 0.25 0.40 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.44 0.32 0.04
25 Merger 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.60 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00
a Data are deleted listwise. Means and standard deviations are reported in the original metric; correlations whose absolute values are
greater than 0.1 are significant at p 0.05. The sample used in this correlation table also excludes cases where the CEO was not terminated
or terminated before restatement, or where there were missing values. Given these exclusions, the maximum sample size among these
variables is 604 cases. Sample size for variables that are only relevant in the second stage, such as successor CEO characteristics, is of
course smaller. Some more samples are excluded in the actual regressions, as detailed in their respective tables. The mean and standard
deviations of successor CEOs are calculated based on eligible samples in the second stage.
b To reduce skewness and kurtosis, variables are logged and mean-centered, except for all binary variables (when logging, the minimum
necessary constant is added to avoid the logging of negative numbers).
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increases analysts’ earnings forecasts (Model 6c:
  0.05, p  0.001), and decreases negative
media coverage (Model 8c:   0.68, p  0.001).
For Successor CEO turnaround experience, results
in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that, under conditions
of greater restatement severity, naming a successor
with prior turnaround experience as a CEO increases
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Model 6c:   0.01, p 
0.001), increases positive media coverage (Model 7c:
  0.21, p  0.01), and decreases negative media
coverage (Model 8c:   0.01, p  0.05).
The effects of Successor elite education on exter-
nal reactions are mostly supportive, as indicated in
Tables 3 and 4. Results demonstrate that, under
conditions of more severe financial restatements,
the elite educational status of a successor results in
better market performance (Model 5c:  0.09, p
0.001), decreases analysts’ earnings forecasts
(Model 6c:   0.01, p  0.001), increases posi-
tive media coverage (Model 7c:   0.18, p  0.01),
and decreases negative media coverage (Model 8c:
  0.16, p  0.01).
TABLE 2
Successor CEO Characteristics (Second-Stage Heckman)a,b
DV  Successor CEO
Experience
(1  Yes, 0  No)
DV  Successor CEO
Turnaround
Experience
(1  Yes, 0  No)
DV  Successor CEO
Elite Education
(1  Yes, 0  No)
DV  Successor CEO
Fin/Acct
(1  Yes, 0  No)
Dependent Variable Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b
Firm age 0.10 0.04 0.32 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.04*** 0.08***
(0.19) (0.12) (0.23) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm size 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.23*** 0.10***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
Year 2004 0.28 0.05 0.30 0.37 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.69***
(0.37) (0.27) (0.40) (0.32) (0.37) (0.25) (0.24) (0.18)
Year 2005 0.19 0.13 0.43 0.31 0.59 0.38 0.06 0.32
(0.39) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.32) (0.19) (0.20)
Year 2006 0.47 0.24 0.30 0.68 0.13 0.25 4.84*** 4.71***
(0.55) (0.39) (0.68) (0.54) (0.59) (0.38) (0.19) (0.00)
ROA 3.62 8.97 19.25* 12.29 1.11 0.17 1.37*** 3.73***
(2.25) (5.04) (7.84) (10.01) (1.05) (0.61) (0.00) (0.58)
Incumbent CEO elite education 0.18 0.15
(0.31) (0.21)
Incumbent CEO Fin/Acct 4.46*** 4.70***
(0.00) (0.00)
Severity of restatement 0.14* 0.17* 0.10* 0.23***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03)
Constant 0.29 1.72*** 0.54 1.64*** 0.71 1.31*** 2.06*** 0.61***

















N total 554 554 558 558 557 557 548 548.00
N uncensored 109 109 113 113 112 112 103 103.00
Log likelihood 295.60 293.32 295.53 293.30 308.70 306.74 261.7 259.02
LR test (2) 4.55* 4.46* 3.92* 5.40*
Lambda 0.98 2.24** 1.26 2.22 1.55 2.02 3.23*** 1.09***
artrho 0.41 3.45** 0.17 1.05 0.43 1.89 22.55*** 39.09***
(0.91) (1.14) (0.67) (1.09) (0.81) (4.65) (3.08) (3.05)
a Regression model is as indicated; all tests are two-tailed; standard errors are in parentheses. LR tests are against controls-only models
that do not include the severity of restatement variable.
b For conciseness, the output from the selection equation (1st stage) is not shown.
 p  0.10
* p  0.05
** p  0.01
*** p  0.001
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TABLE 3
External Reactions: CAR and Change in Analysts’ Forecasts (Second-Stage Heckman)a,b
DV  Cumulative Abnormal Return DV  Change in Analysts’ Forecasts
Variables Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c
Firm age 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.10
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Firm size 0.04 0.02 0.02* 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year 2004 0.35 0.29** 0.22* 0.06 0.22 0.22
(0.24) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13)
Year 2005 0.26 0.19 0.15* 0.03 0.01 0.00
(0.20) (0.13) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Year 2006 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.35 0.40 0.30
(0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.29) (0.20) (0.17)
ROA 3.71 2.22 7.18*** 1.85 2.39 1.64
(2.08) (1.41) (0.81) (3.55) (2.53) (1.47)
Severity of restatement 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Change in number of analysts 0.03 0.03 0.45***
(0.04) (0.46) (0.00)
CAR 0.01 0.01 0.03***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
Successor CEO experience 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.01***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.14) (0.00)
Successor CEO turnaround experience 0.33 0.32*** 0.00 0.05***
(0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
Incumbent CEO elite education 0.17 0.33***
(0.09) (0.02)
Successor CEO elite education 0.17 0.28*** 0.00 0.03***
(0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00)
Incumbent CEO from Fin/Acctg 0.04 0.06***
(0.04) (0.00)
Successor CEO from Fin/Acctg 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01***
(0.14) (0.06) (0.11) (0.00)
















Constant 2.71*** 2.86*** 3.02*** 0.69* 0.69*** 0.71***
(0.18) (0.10) (0.07) (0.30) (0.08) (0.17)
Estimation model Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman
N total 463 463 463 493 488 488
N uncensored 36 36 36 48 43 43
Log likelihood 90.91 83.35 73.71 117.4 107.5 96.9
LR test (2) 15.12** 34.40*** 19.80** 41.00***
Lambda 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.48* 0.50*** 0.49***
artrho 17.27*** 18.31*** 17.57*** 18.44*** 17.67*** 18.01***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.50) (0.17) (0.13)
lnsigma 0.98*** 1.17*** 1.36*** 0.74 0.69* 0.72*
(0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.46) (0.32) (0.30)
a Regression model is as indicated; all tests are two-tailed; standard errors are in parentheses. LR tests are against controls-only models.
Whenever insignificant, incumbent CEO characteristics are not included in order to yield simpler models and conserve statistical power.
b For conciseness, the output from the selection equation (first stage) is not shown.
 p  0.10
* p  0.05
** p  0.01
*** p  0.001
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Finally, when examining the effect of naming a
successor CEO with a background in finance or ac-
counting, under conditions of greater restatement se-
verity the resultsmostly contradicted our hypotheses.
Naming a successor with a background in finance or
accounting increases stock market performance
TABLE 4
External Reactions: Positive and Negative Media Coverage (2nd Stage Heckman)a,b
DV  Positive Media Coverage DV  Negative Media Coverage
Variables Model 7a Model 7b Model 7c Model 8a Model 8b Model 8c
Firm age 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.02
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.33) (0.45) (0.23)
Firm size 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.14
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Year 2004 0.58* 0.65* 0.59* 1.29* 1.58* 1.40**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.56) (0.67) (0.52)
Year 2005 0.32 0.44 0.24 1.09 1.45* 1.25*
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.56) (0.71) (0.60)
Year 2006 0.41 0.46 0.29 1.84* 1.86* 1.87**
(0.40) (0.63) (0.41) (0.78) (0.92) (0.64)
ROA 12.44* 9.17 12.20* 24.90* 15.14 17.26*
(6.01) (6.23) (5.44) (10.84) (10.99) (8.59)
Severity of restatement 0.16* 0.11 0.18* 0.44*** 0.33* 0.13
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Successor CEO experience 0.23*** 0.26** 0.32 0.10
(0.00) (0.10) (0.72) (0.33)
Successor CEO turnaround experience 0.03*** 0.32** 0.50 0.15
(0.00) (0.11) (0.59) (0.23)
Incumbent CEO elite education 0.72*** 0.53***
(0.16) (0.04)
Successor CEO elite education 0.15*** 0.04 0.44 0.80**
(0.00) (0.10) (0.48) (0.25)
Successor CEO from Fin/Acctg 0.12*** 0.23 0.44 0.85***
(0.00) (0.14) (0.96) (0.00)
Severity of restatement  Successor CEO experience 0.08 0.68***
(0.05) (0.11)












Constant 2.28*** 2.00*** 2.08*** 2.12*** 1.21 0.83
(0.37) (0.25) (0.34) (0.46) (0.88) (0.57)
Estimation model Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman
N total 530 529 529 530 529 529
N uncensored 85 84 84 85 84 84
Log likelihood 286.2 279.2 270.0 345.1 336.7 321.1
LR test (2) 14.00*** 32.40*** 16.80** 48.00***
Lambda 1.63*** 1.57*** 1.53*** 3.11*** 2.96*** 2.53***
artrho 18.50*** 17.92*** 18.37*** 18.43*** 17.98*** 18.49***
(0.20) (0.09) (0.00) (0.44) (0.10) (0.20)
lnsigma 0.49** 0.45** 0.42* 1.14*** 1.09*** 0.93***
(0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
a Regression model is as indicated; all tests are two-tailed; standard errors are in parentheses. LR tests are against controls-only models.
Whenever insignificant, incumbent CEO characteristics are not included in order to yield simpler models and conserve statistical power.
b For conciseness the output from the selection equation (first stage) is not shown.
 p  0.10
* p  0.05
** p  0.01
*** p  0.001
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(Model 5c:  0.04, p 0.05), yet decreases analysts’
earnings forecasts (Model 6c:   0.03, p  0.001)
and increases negative media coverage (Model 8c:
  0.27, p  0.001).
To further examine Hypothesis 4, we plotted all
the interactions between restatement severity and
successor CEO characteristics that were found to be
statistically significant. For each interaction, we
plotted how restatement severity moderates the in-
fluence of restating firms’ successor CEO character-
istics at three different levels of restatement sever-
ity: the mean, one standard deviation above the
mean, and one standard deviation below the mean.
We then examined how the slope of the line
changes across these levels. We grouped the plots
based on the successor characteristics hypothe-
sized in Hypotheses 4a to 4d.
For Successor CEO experience, Figure 1a shows
how, at the mean level of severity, appointing a
successor with CEO experience increases CAR
(3.97%). The increase is more pronounced when
severity increases but less so when severity de-
creases. Figure 1b shows how, at the mean level of
restatement severity, such an appointment in-
creases analysts’ forecasts ($0.40 increase in earn-
ings per share (EPS)). This increase is more (less)
pronounced when the severity is at one standard
deviation higher (lower). Figure 1c illustrates how
experienced successors reduce negative media cov-
erage by 4.17% at mean restatement severity, but
not at one standard deviation below. Altogether,
these findings suggest a more positive reaction by
outside observers to the naming of a successor with
CEO experience when severity is greater.
For Successor CEO turnaround experience, Fig-
ure 2a, illustrating the reaction of analysts, shows
how the slopes across the different levels of sever-
ity are quite homogeneous. This suggests that the
interaction between such an appointment and re-
statement severity has a relatively minimal effect in
influencing analysts’ opinions. Similarly, Figure 2c
shows how the interaction effect is also relatively
minimal in influencing negative media reporting.
In contrast, this interaction is more pronounced
when it comes to influencing positive media cov-
erage, as shown in Figure 2b. For this, such an
appointment increases positive media reporting by
3.26% when severity is at one standard deviation
above the mean, but decreases coverage by 1.55%
at one standard deviation below. This range shows
a more substantial interaction effect. We further
discuss this variation in effect size below.
For Successor elite education, the interaction ef-
fect is quite pronounced across all the dependent
variables, except for the analysts’ forecasts in Fig-
ure 3b. Figure 3a indicates that such an appoint-
FIGURE 1c
Severity  Successor CEO Experience: Negative
Media Coverage
FIGURE 1a
Severity  Successor CEO Experience:
Cumulative Abnormal Return
FIGURE 1b
Severity  Successor CEO Experience: Change in
Analysts’ Forecasts
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ment maintains market reaction (CAR) better when
severity is at one standard deviation above the
mean. Figure 3c shows how such an appointment
increases positive media coverage by 2.49% at the
mean level but by 5.29% when severity is at one
standard deviation higher. Figure 3d shows how
such successors better moderate any increase in
negative media coverage when severity is higher.
Together, these figures point to a favorable moder-
ating effect of elite educational background when
severity is higher, as hypothesized.
For the effects of Successor CEO from finance or
accounting, the plots show how such an appoint-
ment seems to be met with rather mixed reactions.
Figure 4b shows how this functional background
reduces analysts’ forecasts more when severity is at
one standard deviation above the mean ($0.49) than
when severity is one standard deviation below
($0.02). Figure 4c shows how the appointment re-
duces negative media coverage more when severity
is lower, not higher. Altogether, Figure 4b and 4c
suggest that such a successor is less welcome when
severity is higher. Yet Figure 4a shows how CAR
increases more when a restating firm appoints suc-
cessors with this background, especially when se-
verity is higher (3.11% increase at one standard
deviation above the mean versus 1.10% at the
mean). We discuss below some possible arguments
as to why a successor with prior experience in
accounting or finance may experience a less posi-
tive reaction from outside observers.
FIGURE 2a
Severity  Successor CEO Turnaround
Experience: Change in Analysts’ Forecasts
FIGURE 2b
Successor CEO Turnaround Experience 
Severity: Positive Media Coverage
FIGURE 2c
Successor CEO Turnaround Experience 
Severity: Negative Media Coverage
FIGURE 3a
Successor CEO Elite Education  Severity:
Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Additional Analyses
We ran several additional analyses to further ex-
amine these phenomena. First, we created a single
categorical variable that takes the value of 0 if a
successor CEO has no previous experience of being
a CEO, 1 if a successor CEO has prior CEO experi-
ence, and 2 if a successor CEO has both prior CEO
and turnaround experience. While this coding may
raise questions as to whether a score of two actually
indicates a doubling of the effect that a score of one
represents, the results using this measurement are
similar to those mentioned above. That is, the se-
verity of restatement increases the likelihood of
selecting a successor who has both prior CEO and
turnaround experience (p 0.001) and that such an
experience increases CAR (p  0.001). Second and
relatedly, we have expanded our data to investigate
whether any of our successors had any turnaround
experience as a TMT member although not as a
CEO. Careful examination of our data indicated
that we had 12 such cases. Running similar analy-
ses using this expanded definition of turnaround
CEO, we found that when severity increases, a firm
is more likely to choose such individuals as suc-
cessor CEOs, which is similar to our earlier find-
ings. However, with the expanded definition of
turnaround CEO, the increase in CAR and positive
media coverage as severity increases indicates a
weaker significance (p  0.10) than before. This
suggests that prior experience as a CEO, rather than
just as a TMT member, in a turnaround company
sends a stronger signal to the market and media.
Third, we also checked whether there were any
cases in which a successor CEO came from a firm
FIGURE 3b
Successor CEO Elite Education  Severity:
Change in Analysts’ Forecasts
FIGURE 3c
Successor CEO Elite Education  Severity:
Positive Media Coverage
FIGURE 3d
Successor CEO Elite Education  Severity:
Negative Media Coverage
FIGURE 4a
Successor CEO from Fin/Acctg  Severity:
Cumulative Abnormal Return
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that had restated before. We found no case where a
successor had earlier been a CEO at another restat-
ing firm, but found nine cases where a successor
had earlier been in the top management team (as
COO, CFO, EVP, SVP, or President, but not as CEO)
of another restating firm. We analyzed these cases
but found no significant effect—i.e., severity
does not increase the likelihood of selecting a re-
stating firm successor, nor the likelihood that such
a successor generates significant market or media
reaction. We believe, however, that the small num-
ber of observations is likely to contribute to this
lack of significance.
Fourth, in addition to our severity of restatement
variable, we included a restatement dummy vari-
able that takes the value of 1 for the restating firm
and 0 for the matching firm. None of our conclu-
sions changed, although the significance of sever-
ity of restatement weakened in some models,
which is likely to have been caused by the pair-
wise correlation between the dichotomous mea-
sure and the severity measure (r  0.75, p 
0.001). Finally, depending on the dependent vari-
able being estimated, there are differences in
sample size across Tables 2, 3, and 4, which we
explain in the Appendix A.
DISCUSSION
How does the naming of a new CEO help to signal
a firm’s seriousness in responding to a reputation-
damaging event? How do characteristics of the new
CEO influence the reaction to this announcement by
the market, analysts, and the media? These are the
primary questions this research attempts to address.
Although past work has demonstrated that firms
tend to replace their top management following
the revelation of financial restatement, a source
of reputational damage (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006;
Cowen & Marcel, 2011), these studies have not
examined the types of successors who are re-
cruited and whether these successors are effec-
tive in helping firms signal their determination to
restore their reputations (Rhee & Kim, 2012). In
this study, we examined how the attributes of
CEO successors help to signal their competence
and ability to help the firm recover from reputa-
tional damage following financial earnings re-
statements. Our results show that more severe
restatements have led to successors who were
more likely to have previously served as
CEOs, more likely to have had turnaround expe-
rience, more likely to have gone to an elite
school, and more likely to have had prior func-
tional experience in areas other than finance or
accounting. We then examined how these char-
acteristics influenced reactions to the announce-
ment of the successor from the stock market,
investment analysts, and the media, demonstrat-
ing that these constituencies reacted favorably to
these successor characteristics, especially when
the restatement was more severe. These overall
findings are accompanied by some less obvious
insights that we highlight below.
The results of our empirical tests support the
notion that certain characteristics of a CEO suc-
cessor are likely to signal a commitment to recov-
ery from reputation damage following financial
restatement. Our findings are consistent with
past work in signaling theory that has argued that
the observability and cost of signals have an im-
FIGURE 4b
Successor CEO from Fin/Acctg  Severity:
Change in Analysts’ Forecasts
FIGURE 4c
Successor CEO from Fin/Acctg  Severity:
Negative Media Coverage
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portant influence on their effectiveness (Con-
nelly et al., 2011). The announcement of a well-
qualified successor constitutes a signal that is
observable to external observers and relatively
costly, since an experienced and educated CEO
may be difficult to recruit.
Differences in the characteristics of a signal to
observers help to explain why some signals are
more influential than others. Signals that are more
salient or a better match for the task at hand may
generate more consistent reactions across different
constituencies. In our study, audiences seemed to
react more consistently to prior CEO experience, a
specific signal that is highly salient and fitting,
than to functional background, a relatively weaker
or less salient signal that received a more mixed
reaction in our results. Signals that are relatively
less observable may also be less influential. In our
study, a successor’s experience as a turnaround
manager may have been less observable or less
prominently promoted as part of the succession
event, and external reactions to turnaround back-
ground were less pronounced in our results. Fur-
ther, to the extent that prior CEO experience is
already a sufficiently salient signal, the additional
knowledge that the successor also had experience
as a turnaround manager might have been less
consequential.
Signaler characteristics can also have an impor-
tant influence on the reactions of external observ-
ers. As Connelly et al. (2011) suggest, these charac-
teristics can influence how a signal is interpreted
and calibrated. In our study, the severity of restate-
ment was a central characteristic of firms (signal-
ers) and had a significant influence on how exter-
nal constituencies calibrated their response to
characteristics of successor CEOs. Receiver charac-
teristics may also result in differences in how a
signal is interpreted and reacted to. For example, a
successor characteristic like elite education may
seem more interesting to the media (because it may
be germane to their readership) than to analysts,
who, given their acquaintances and social network,
may be less likely to view elite education as a
distinguishing feature.
Interestingly, and counter to our original hypoth-
esis, we found that firms having to make a more
severe restatement were less likely to recruit suc-
cessors with finance or accounting backgrounds,
and that successors with these backgrounds
showed much more mixed results across the exter-
nal constituencies we examined than those with
other backgrounds. Restating firms may face the
dilemma of trying to choose successors who will
ensure that such a reputation-damaging event
does not recur in the future while at the same time
distancing themselves from the financial and ac-
counting taint that a financial restatement repre-
sents. A restating firm may want to direct public
attention away from the concerns that originally
led to its reputation damage, which might be best
accomplished by hiring a successor CEO with a
background in an area other than accounting or
finance.
Contributions to Theory
We believe that this study offers several contri-
butions to the literature. The recent review of firm
reputation and its restoration by Rhee and Kim
(2012) notes that past studies examining reputation
restoration following a reputation-damaging event
tend to be normative or suggestive rather than em-
pirical. As such, these studies tend to advise what
firms should do but not to examine what firms
actually do to restore their damaged reputations or
whether their actions generate favorable reactions.
We draw on signaling theories to empirically dem-
onstrate how firms respond to reputation damage
by appointing a successor CEO with specific char-
acteristics, signaling the firm’s commitment and
responsiveness to restoring the reputation of the
firm. By providing a finer-grained examination and
analysis of these efforts that clearly underscores
how firms may work to restore their reputation and
credibility by selecting CEO successors who stake-
holders are likely to perceive as competent, we
extend past theoretical work that has argued that
firms should take specific actions in response to
their damaged reputations but has not offered spe-
cific remedies nor the means to test them (Pfarrer et
al., 2008). This focus on the prominence of CEO
succession events and the public nature of the in-
formation is also particularly relevant to signal ef-
forts to restore reputation, given that theory sug-
gests that restoration efforts need to show
consistency between external and internal actions
(Pfarrer et al., 2008; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). An
empirical investigation also allows us to observe
non-obvious findings, such as how a signal that is
arguably one of the least informative about a CEO’s
ability to address the problem at hand (i.e., elite
education) appears to have the overall strongest
effects across the broadest range of audiences.
Past theoretical work has recommended that
firms take stronger actions to restore their damaged
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reputations (Mishina et al., 2012; Pfarrer et al.,
2008). Rhee and Kim (2012) provide a preliminary
framework for grouping these efforts on a contin-
uum from more substantial to more superficial,
based on the salience of the actions; our findings
offer empirical support for their arguments. While
the appointment of a new CEO may often reflect an
overall effort to redirect the firm, some successor
characteristics may be viewed as more relevant
than others and thus yield a more substantive in-
fluence in helping a firm restore its reputation.
To the extent that prior experience as a CEO is
viewed as more valuable than elite education or
functional experience, that first attribute may re-
flect a more substantive signal than either of the
second or third attributes named. In addition, al-
though some studies have theorized that reactions
to illegitimate practices may vary based on their
severity (Devers et al., 2009), past work has not
empirically examined whether firms react differ-
ently or more strongly to more severe reputation-
damaging events (Pfarrer et al., 2008). Our study is
the first to do so, as we examine how the degree of
financial restatement influences responses to it.
This complements past studies that have examined
the effects of restatement more broadly but that
have not differentiated among degrees of severity
(e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). Understanding how
firms calibrate their responses depending on the
severity of financial earnings restatement allows us
to better understand the extent to which they may
be motivated to take remedial action.
Finally, in our attempt to understand signals for
reputation restoration, our empirical findings also
contribute to signaling theory by simultaneously
demonstrating the importance of signal character-
istics, examining the effect of signals across differ-
ent receivers, and focusing on negative qualities of
the signalers, which is in contrast to past studies
which have focused almost exclusively on positive
qualities of the signalers (Connelly et al., 2011). By
providing empirical examination of these aspects,
we can better understand whether and how they
work to reinforce and complement each other. Spe-
cifically, our finding shows that a similar signal—
e.g., a finance and accounting background—can
generate different reactions across different receiv-
ers. This is rather surprising as signaling theory
generally assumes that a signal will be inter-
preted in the same way regardless of receiver
(Spence, 1973).
Limitations and Future Research
A key limitation of this study is that the reputa-
tion-damaging events we have observed all take
place within the context of U.S. firms and a U.S.
legal and governance framework. Due to differ-
ences in culture and financial reporting systems
across countries, similar reputation-damaging
events may vary idiosyncratically depending on
how oversight of financial reporting occurs within
any given nation. Future researchers can identify
other opportunities for the study of reputation
damage and how it might be restored in other coun-
tries and cultures, perhaps in the context of differ-
ent types of financial and non-financial events.
Also, while we examine external reactions, we
do not determine whether reputations are actually
repaired by hiring a successor CEO with these char-
acteristics. Further, it is possible that some of the
restatements are caused by unintentional error, and
so are perhaps rooted in incompetence rather than
misconduct. This study does not make this distinc-
tion, which could have important implications for
reputation repair and should be investigated fur-
ther (Elsbach & Currall, 2012).
We believe there are several interesting and sig-
nificant opportunities for future research, building
on this work. Given the focus of past research on
the role of the CEO as a substantive and symbolic
representative of the firm, we have focused on chief
executive replacement as the locus of reputation
recovery efforts. Interesting future work could ex-
amine other actions that a firm might take to signal
its seriousness at responding to instances of repu-
tation-damaging events and observe how these ac-
tions might influence stakeholders’ reactions. Fur-
ther, while this study focused on objective CEO
characteristics such as prior CEO and turnaround
experience, future studies may consider more so-
cially-constructed attributes of successor CEOs,
such as perceived celebrity or charisma (Hayward,
Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Wade, Porac, Pollock, &
Graffin, 2006). Such studies could examine how
the status and reputations of both the incumbent
and successor CEOs play a role in this process.
Future studies could also examine an organiza-
tion’s internal processes following similar events—
for example, whether and how a firm recognizes
reputational damage, searches for solutions, and
attempts to restore reputation, and how these ef-
forts might vary according to the severity of the
reputational damage (Rhee & Kim, 2012). In a re-
lated vein, recent work attempting to differentiate
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between concepts of negative reputation and
stigma could also be developed further (Mishina &
Devers, 2012). Although not focused on stigma, our
study offers some indication of how reputation and
stigma differ: while removing stigma has been ar-
gued to be very challenging (Hudson & Okhuysen,
2009), influencing external reactions following a
damaged reputation may be less difficult.
Disappointing outcomes around firm perfor-
mance and loss of shareholder wealth following
financial scandals have already led to severe re-
structuring of firm governance and oversight. The
current and protracted economic crisis has only
heightened the concern that oversight may need to
be tightened even further to prevent illegitimate
actions by firms in the future. We hope that this
research will help to crystallize some of the key
issues around financial restatement, reputation
loss, and reputation restoration that managers and
policymakers need to focus on both now and into
the future, while also providing a useful foundation
for future studies.
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APPENDIX A
Variations in Sample Size across Models
The following factors influenced differences in sample
sizes across our models:
1. We dropped observations where the incumbent CEO
departed as a result of non-dismissal reasons, e.g.,
retirement or taking up another position (Shen & Can-
nella, 2002). This reduced our total sample by 8% of
the original sample.
2. The use of a two-stage model further decreased our
sample since some of the variables in the second stage
were not available and the Heckman model drops such
cases. The Heckmanmodel is very conservative, treating
any missing data as non-random (if they are indeed
random, it should not affect the analyses besides of
course the loss of observations; www.stata.com/
support/faqs/statistics/sample-and-heckman-model/.)
Given the automatic exclusion that occurs with using
Stata, our sample size experienced the following
reduction:
Around 7.7% when the final dependent variable (DV)
is successors’ characteristics; 9.4% when the final DV is
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR); 11.4% when the
final DV is positive or negative media coverage; and
16.3% when the final DV is change in analysts’ forecast
(a larger decline because analysts’ ratings are not as com-
monly available as CAR or media coverage). The main
reason why these data were not available was because the
firm was merged or acquired, or no longer followed by
analysts. When the final DV was CAR, we also needed to
drop firms that release “strategic noise,” which are news
announcements during the five-day window around the
announcement of the successor CEO but which do not
pertain to the successor CEO appointment (Graffin et al.,
2011). This reduced the relevant sample by 11.8%.
3. Finally, some observations were dropped because of
missing values for some of the control or independent
variables (ranging from 2.1 to 3.4%). Ultimately, we
had from 463 to 558 cases that were without any loss
of observations and eligible for further analyses.
To give an example, in the case of predicting successor
CEO characteristics in Table 2 Model 1a (and 1b) that has
N total  554 and N uncensored  109, the following is
the breakdown. We started with 704 firms and then
dropped these firms: 5 firms where the duration between
analysts’ forecasts is too long, 77 firms where the CEO
cannot be considered as being terminated for various
reasons, 56 firms where data of successor CEO experi-
ence in the second stage are not available, and 12 firms
that are deleted listwise due to missing variables. After
dropping these 150 firms, our initial 704 firms reduced to
554 firms. From here only 109 firms, or 20%, experi-
enced a CEO replacement, which is close to the overall
average where 26% of all firms experienced a CEO re-
placement. Of course, the actual breakdown varies across
models.
However and importantly, we did compare the firms
that were dropped for the reasons mentioned above with
the remaining firms in terms of size, profitability, and
year dummies. We found no significant difference.
APPENDIX B
Ivy League schools Elite private schools (Long et al., 1998)c
Brown University Carnegie Mellon University*
Columbia University* Duke University*
Cornell University* Emory University*
Dartmouth College Imperial College of Science (UK)*, 
Harvard University* Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
Princeton University New York University*
University of Pennsylvania* Northwestern University*
Yale University* Stanford University*
Public Ivy League schools Tufts University*, 
Listed as public Ivy League in Moll (1985) University of Chicago*
College of William & Mary (Williamsburg, Virginia)
Miami University (Oxford, Ohio)
University of California (campuses as of 1985)*,
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)*
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*
University of Texas at Austin*
University of Vermont (Burlington)
University of Virginia (Charlottesville)
University of Southern California*
Vanderbilt University




U.S. Coast Guard Academy
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
U.S. Air Force Academy
Listed as runners up of Ivy League in Moll (1985) a
Georgia Institute of Technology*
New College of the U. of South Florida
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Pennsylvania State University at University Park*
State University of New York at Binghamton
University of Colorado Boulder*
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
University of Pittsburgh
University of Washington*
University of Wisconsin Madison*
Not listed in Moll (1985) but appeared in our





Note:* Schools that appear in our own sample.
 Specifically, the successor CEOs in our sample graduated from University of California, Berkeley and UCLA.
 These schools are not listed in Long et al. (1998) but are generally considered as elite private schools.
a Although originally listed as runners up, we believe the schools that appeared in our sample are generally considered as highly
reputable public schools: Georgia Tech, Penn State, U. Colorado, U. Washington, U. Wisconsin-Madison.
b We do not claim that these are the only other highly reputable public schools. Rather, we focus on large, research intensive, flagship
public universities that appear in our sample.
c Long et al. (1998) did not set out to purposely list elite private schools. However, their list expectedly includes schools widely
considered as elite private schools—although the list may not be exhaustive.
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